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a BI system could only emerge in the political equilibrium under very strong and
empirically implausible conditions. Instead, the political process leads to a means
tested system. The necessity to draw political support does affect the design of the
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1 Introduction
The replacement of some or all welfare payments with a “basic income” or universal
allowance represents one of the oldest debates, both in the public finance literature
and in the political arena; see, e.g., Atkinson (1996). At first, this appears to be an
“ideal” solution, which would avoid the problems associated with means tested programs
like limited take up, poverty traps created by high effective marginal tax rates, and
stigmatization; see, e.g., Van Parijs (2004). Yet, while it has been consistently advocated
by many prominent economists, other social scientists and politicians, a basic income
scheme has never been implemented on a significant scale in reality.
A recent article in The Economist entitled “Basically unaffordable” concludes by
stating: “Basic income: the clue is in the name”.1 And the article is best summarized
by saying “. . . the clue is in the title”. Though journalistic in style, the article brings
across the main point in a pretty forceful and rigorous way. Howsoever, wonderful, fair
and simple the idea of a basic income may appear, it has just one catch, namely that it
is . . . basically unaffordable; see, e.g., Horstschräer, Clauss and Schnabel (2010).
While we do not disagree with this argument, it probably tells only part of the “true
story”, and any (public) economist knows that the simple fact that a policy is “too
expensive” does not necessarily prevent it from being implemented. In this paper we
leave the realm of normative public economics, and show that there is a purely positive
explanation for the failure to implement a basic income scheme, namely the lack of
political support.2 This may at first sound surprising because universality of a system
is often justified by the necessity to draw political support; see, e.g., Casamatta, Cremer
and Pestieau (2000). We show in a very simple setting that if society votes on the type of
system, its generosity as well as the “severity” of means testing (if any), a basic income
system could only emerge in the political equilibrium under very strong and empirically
implausible conditions. Instead, the political process leads to a means tested system.
1See http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21651897-replacing-welfare-
payments-basic-income-all-alluring.
2A normative analysis of a universal schemes versus a means tested welfare scheme is undertaken by
Besley (1990).
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The necessity to draw political support does affect the design of the system, but it only
implies that means testing becomes less severe so that benefits are extended also to the
middle classes. However, a fully universal system is rejected by a majority.
2 The model
Consider a continuum of individuals who differ in their income  ∈ R+0 with  ∈ {0 1 2}.
Income levels satisfy 0 = 0  1  2. Population size is normalized to one and the
proportion of type- individuals is given by  ∈ (0 12) where 12  0 + 1, implying
that 1 is the median income, . Assume 2  1(1−1)2 which implies that median
income is below average income:  = 1  ¯ ≡ P . Utilities are given by (),
with 0  0 and 00  0, where  is consumption of a numeraire commodity.
The welfare scheme, if any, can be either means tested (MT ) or a pay a basic income
(BI ) to everyone. A MT scheme pays solely to type-0 and type-1 individuals a transfer
of max{0; (−)} where  ∈ [0 max] measures the degree of crowding out of welfare
benefits. We can think of  as representing the degree of severity at which means testing
is enforced. When  = 0 means testing is “soft” and full benefits are paid to the middle
class. On the other hand, when  ≥1, means testing is strict and benefits are paid
only to the poorest individuals. Under the BI scheme, all individuals receive a lump-sum
transfer . Compared to the BI scheme, the MT scheme has a targeting advantage,
but this advantage comes at costs. First, since benefits are claimed only by a share of
the population, beneficiaries suffer from stigmatization. These stigma costs reduce the
monetary value of the transfer to (−) where  ∈ [0 1]. Second, as long as   0,
crowding out increases the marginal tax rates of beneficiaries which exacerbates labor
disincentives. Both transfers  and  are financed by a proportional income tax at a
uniform nominal rate of .
Under a BI scheme, individual utilities are given by
 = ((1− ) +) for  = 0 1 2 (1)
2
And a MT scheme yields the following utility levels
0 =  ()  (2)
1 =  ((1− )1 + ( − 1))  (3)
2 =  ((1− )2)  (4)
Following for instance, Galasso and Profeta (2007) and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007),
we capture the distortions due to income taxation by correcting the tax base with the
distortionary factor 1−  and 1− − (i.e. 1 minus the effective marginal tax rate) for
beneficiaries in the MT scheme. This reduced form reflects the adverse impact of each
welfare scheme on the labor supply decision (which we do not explicitly model). The
government budget constraints with the BI and the MT welfare scheme are represented
by
(1− )¯ =  ⇒ () (5)
2(1− )2 + 1(+ )(1− − )1 = (0 + 1) ⇒( ) (6)
Both transfers  and exhibit a “Laffer curve” relationship with respect to the income
tax rate, i.e.
()
 = (1− 2)¯ ≷ 0 ⇔  ≶ 05 (7)
( )
 =
(1− 2)¯ − 211
0 + 1 ≷ 0 ⇔  ≶ 05− 11 (8)
where 1 ≡ 1¯ is the ratio of median to average income.
We assume that society votes on the income tax rate , and additionally on  when
a MT is in place. The transfers  and  are then determined by equation (5) and (6)
respectively. Substituting from (5) and (6) into (1) and (2)—(4), utility levels achieved
by type- individuals under the two welfare schemes can be expressed by their indirect
utility functions:
  () = 
¡
(1− ) +()¢ ∀  (9)
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0 ( ) =  (( ))  (10)
1 ( ) =  ((1− )1 + (( )− 1))  (11)
2 ( ) = 
¡
(1− )2¢ (12)
3 Voting procedure
We consider the following sequence of events. In a first stage, individuals vote on their
preferred welfare scheme. If a majority emerges, the corresponding program is adopted,
otherwise we have the status quo, 0, with no welfare scheme and no subsequent voting.
When BI is implemented, individuals vote on the generosity of the system as rep-
resented by the tax rate . When MT is chosen, individuals vote sequentially, first on
the crowding out fact  and then on the nominal tax rate  .
In either case we study the subgame perfect majority voting equilibrium under which
individuals at any stage anticipate the induced equilibrium in subsequent stages, if any.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
3.1 Political equilibrium with a basic income scheme
First, we assume the BI has been chosen in the first stage and study the determination
of the equilibrium tax rate, . The preferred income tax rate of type- individual’s, ,
maximizes their indirect utility, equation (9), i.e.,
max 
 () s.t.  ≥ 0
The first-order condition (FOC) of this problem is
  ()
 = 
0() [− + (1− 2)¯] ≤ 0
The first expression in brackets reflects the direct costs of higher income taxes which
are increasing in income and the second term represents the increase in the lump-sum
transfer . As the indirect utility function of a type- agent is concave in , preferences
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are single-peaked.3 Solving equation (3.1) for the income tax rate yields
 = max
½
0;
1− 
2
¾
 (13)
Not surprisingly, type-2 agents oppose a positive income tax rate as they are net con-
tributors to the welfare scheme. Type-0 and type-1 agents, by contrast, gain from the
income redistribution that the BI scheme achieves through a combination of a pro-
portional income tax rate and a lump-sum transfer, . These agents always vote for
positive taxation.
Equation (13) implies the following ranking of individuals’ most preferred income
tax rates
2 = 0  1  0 
Since type-0 and 1 agents constitute a majority, the median voter is a type-1 individual,
implying
 ≡ 1 = 1− 12  0 (14)
as 1 ≡ 1¯  1. In other words, the median voter always votes for positive income
taxation. As type-1 individuals have below-average income, they contribute less to the
BI scheme than they get out of it. Their preferred tax rate is thus always positive but
below the maximum of the Laffer curve because benefits from redistribution are traded
off against larger tax distortions. Summing up, we have established the following lemma.
Lemma 1 When BI is adopted in the first stage, the induced voting equilibrium tax rate
is the most preferred choice of type 1 individuals and given by equation (14).
3.2 Political equilibrium with a means-tested welfare scheme
Now, we assume that a MT scheme is in place and determine the voting equilibrium
levels  and  . Since the vote is sequential we start by the last stage, and study the
3We have 2  ()
2 = 
00() [− + (1− 2)¯]2 − 0()2¯  0 ∀ 
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determination of  given . Most-preferred income tax rates are obtained by maximizing
indirect utility as given by (10)—(11), i.e.
max 
 ( ) s.t.  ≥ 0
The FOC for type-2 agents is −0(2)2  0 so that their most-preferred income tax
rate is 2 = 0. They contribute to the welfare scheme without receiving any benefits.
For type-0 and 1 individuals the FOC is
 ( )
 = 
0()
∙
− + 
µ
(1− 2)¯ − 211
0 + 1
¶¸
≤ 0 (15)
The first expression in brackets reflects the direct costs of higher income taxes which
are nil for type-0 individuals, and the second term represents the increase in the means-
tested benefit  adjusted by the costs of stigma. Again, as the indirect utility function
of a type- agent is concave in  preferences are single-peaked.4 Solving equation (15)
for the income tax rate yields for  = 0 1
 () = max
½
0;
1
2
−  − 0 + 1
2 
¾
 (16)
Since expression (16) is decreasing in  and thus in income, the median voter is again
a type-1 individual:
 ≡ 1 () = max
½
0;
1
2
− 11 − 0 + 1
2 1
¾
 (17)
The median voter’s income tax rate has the following properties

 = −11  0 (18)
( + )
 =  (1− 11)  0 (19)
In other words, while the nominal tax rate increases, the effective tax rate faced by the
median voter increases as  increases.
4The second order condition is given by
2 ( )
2 = 
00()

− + 

(1− 2)¯ − 211
0 + 1
2
− 0() 2¯0 + 1  0
.
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To study voters preferences over  we differentiate  ¡ () ¢  which yields5
 ¡ () ¢
 =
−2211(1− 11)
0 + 1  0 (20)
When  increases welfare benefits for type-1 individuals are reduced, but at the same
time  and thus contributions of type-2 individuals decrease. Given the inverse u-
shaped Laffer curve this negative effect outweighs the positive effect.
An individual’s most preferred level of  is determined by maximizing  ( () );
since the vote on  precedes the one on , individuals account for the induced change
in the equilibrium level of ,  (). We have
2 (  )
 =−

 2  0 (21)
1 (  )
 =−
( + )
 1 + 
(  )
  0 (22)
0 (  )
 =
(  )
  0 (23)
so that individuals of types 0 and 1 most-prefer  = 0, while type-2 individuals want
the level of  to be as large as possible. The median voter is then of type 1:
 = 0 = 1 = 0  2 = 
Substituting  = 0 into (17) then completes the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2 When MT is adopted in the first stage, the induced voting equilibrium is
given by  = 0 and
 = max
½
0 1
2
− 0 + 1
2 1
¾
 (24)
5We have
  () 
 =
22(1− 2 ) + 11(1− 2( + ))(
+)
0 + 1 
Using the properties of  and rearranging yields (20).
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3.3 Basic income versus means-testing
We now turn to the first stage in which society decides which welfare scheme, if any, to
implement. For doing this we have to rank each individual’s utilities with a BI, a MT
and no welfare scheme. The former two possibilities must be evaluated at the second
stage voting outcome(s), namely  and (   ).
Some of these rankings are obvious. First, it is plain that “no system” is type 2’s
most-preferred choice. These individuals lose under both systems. Second, individuals
of type-0 always (weakly) prefer the BI or MT scheme to no welfare scheme; their
contribution is zero and since the benefit is nonnegative, they cannot be made worse off
by a welfare system. Third, the same ranking applies to type-1 individuals because for
the median voter,  = 0 or  = 0 is always an option.
We are thus left with the comparison of BI and MT from the perspective of type-1
and type-0 individuals. Intuitively, we expect this comparison to depend on . Clearly
with  = 0, MI can never be optimal, but it becomes more attractive as  increases.
To make this comparison as easy as possible, first use (14) and (24) to show that when
 = 0 + 1 ≡ ˆ we have
 =  = 1− 12 
which along with the budget constraints (5) and (6) and  = 0 implies that for  = ˆ
we have
( ) = (0 + 1)(   ) = (   )
Consequently, when  = ˆ = 0+1 individuals of types 0 and 1 are indifferent between
BI and MT ; taxes are the same and so are benefits net of stigma ( = ). To
complete the comparison it is then sufficient to show that 1 and 0 are monotonically
increasing in . For individuals of type 1 this follows immediately from the definition
of 1 , equation (11), along with the envelope theorem. Recall that  and  are the
levels that maximize 1 , the utility of the median voter. To show that 0 increases
in , it is sufficient to use its definition, equation (10) along with the property that  ,
as specified by (24), increases in  and so does  .
Putting these elements together we obtain the following individual rankings of BI,
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MT and 0.6
0 ≤   0 + 1  ≥ 0 + 1
types 0 and 1     0     0
type 2 0     0  
A simple inspection of these expression shows that when  ≥ 0+1, there is a majority
in favor of MT, while a BI is adopted when   0 + 17 Recall that 0 + 1 
12. Together with Lemmas 1 and 2 these results establish the following proposition,
which summarizes our main findings and provides a full characterization of the political
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (i) When  ≥ 0 + 1, the political equilibrium implies a means tested
scheme with  = 0 and a tax rate of
 = 12 −
0 + 1
2 1
(ii) When   0 + 1, the political equilibrium implies a basic income scheme with
a tax rate of
 = 1− 12 
In other words, unless the stigma is “very large”, a means tested system prevails.
The system is more generous than a basic income scheme would have been. Indeed, for
the relevant levels of , we have   . This does not come as a surprise. One can
think of (0 + 1) as the cost in terms of tax revenue of a 1 Euro or Dollar net of
stigma means tested transfer. When  ≥ 0 + 1 this cost is lower than 1–the cost of
a unitary universal transfer (again in terms of tax revenue).
6As a tie breaking rule we assume that when individuals are indifferent between BI and MT, they
will vote for MT. This is important for the case where  = 0 + 1. If indifferent individuals of type
0 and 1 were to allocate their vote randomly, we may end up with an outcome where neither system
received a majority so that the status quo prevails, which is the worst outcome for individuals of these
types.
7Note that the ranking of type-2 individuals is irrelevant for our purpose. For  = 0 + 1, type 2
prefers  because it implies the higher benefit.
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4 Concluding comments
The main practical question is of course to know what a “large” stigma means and how
empirically relevant the considered levels are. Our model is very stylized, and the results
therefore have to be interpreted with care and seen as mainly illustrative. This being
said, , in our model is not just a parameter of the utility function; it is expressed in
monetary terms and thus well defined. It measures the net of stigma benefit of a unitary
means tested transfer. Our condition  ≥ 0 + 1 says that this net benefit must be
at least as large as the fraction of the population which receives the transfer. In other
words, the stigma cost of the transfer must not exceed the fraction of the population
which does not receive it. Intuitively, this appears to be a plausible assumption. In
fact, one wouldn’t expect the stigma associated with a transfer, which in equilibrium is
received but a majority of the population, to be that large. But this is ultimately an
empirical question. Ranney and Kushman (1987) estimate a concept which is closest
to our  appears to be who estimate the net of stigma cash equivalent of food stamps.
They find an average level of 96%, which is quite in line with our intuition.
To sum up, under “plausible” levels of , political economy considerations do not
appear to justify a universal system. To draw political support, the crowding out implied
by the means testing rule is reduced to extend the benefits to the middle class. However,
political support is not enhanced any further by making the benefits universal.
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